Article
AI sales forecast: 9 traps so far
Yesterday I could not tear myself away from the computer. When I lifted my head, it was half past eight in the evening. I had been sitting alone upstairs for about three hours.
I was teaching an AI agent that can work independently with data and code. The task: a short-term sales forecast — a predictive view of incoming orders and revenue.
The plan was simple.
Give the agent the data, the campaigns, the context, and let it forecast orders for the next thirty days, every morning. And teach it to understand why the number lands where it lands on a given day.
I decided to build this more robustly than this particular output strictly requires. The reason is broader than one prediction. Once the agent understands what revenue is made of — the tail of a season, a short-term push, an unexpected outage, the effect of overlapping campaigns — a whole field of possibilities opens up for what else I can put it to work on.
One thing was clear from the start. Throwing a pile of numbers at the agent is not enough. For the result to be usable, it has to understand the connections between them. It has to be able to answer "if that seasonal campaign were not running, what would the chart look like?". It has to say "this mid-month peak we are expecting because of a retention campaign ending in two weeks". It has to answer what-if questions and return believable simulations.
The goal is clear.
Another step toward the state when your AI agent joins the team. Get the agent to a level where someone else can say "fine, you take this over, I will do something else". It is not easy.
THE NAIVE FIRST VERSION
The starting position was this. The data warehouse keeps daily order aggregates. The project management tool stores campaigns with tags, start and end dates, types. The marketing plan provides year-on-year growth assumptions.
I gave it to the agent and it produced a formula:
baseline(2026-D) = actual(2025-D, weekday-aligned)
forecast(2026-D) = baseline × growth_target × campaign_multiplier
The multiplier (the number you multiply the baseline by to reflect the impact of a campaign) it pulled from history. A day at the peak of a particular campaign historically had some multiple of revenue compared to the state when no campaign was running. A different multiple for seasonal holidays.
At first glance it looked decent. Close enough to be worth tuning. I started building a dashboard so I could visualise the result while tuning it.
When I asked it to explain the logic and visualise the data, a several-hour battle began.
ROUND 1 — WHY WERE MY PROFILE MULTIPLIERS LYING?
One of the campaigns the model flagged as the strongest. That was wrong.
I wrote to it: "That is completely off. This thematic week is one of the weaker ones. The other campaign running in parallel has a much bigger impact."
The problem was in the baseline (the reference state against which campaign impact is measured). The multiplier was being computed as the ratio of (median of days when the campaign ran) to (median of other days). But "other days" included other parallel campaigns. The baseline was artificially inflated. The lift attribution (the increment in revenue assigned to a campaign) was distorted in both directions — some campaigns overstated, others understated, depending on which other campaigns happened to be running during their inactive days. In overlap periods — which is most of the year — the attribution was completely off.
After I objected, the agent rewrote the baseline definition to "median of days when no push campaign was running". But the result was not suitable as a starting point for analysis. There were few clean days. For some markets and weekdays I did not even have five examples. Campaigns overlap almost continuously.
ROUND 2 — WHY IS AD ATTRIBUTION ONLY THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG?
Then came the attempt to add more context. Measurable campaign impact via ad attribution (assigning orders to a specific ad) — conversions from the ad platforms.
The agent could not interpret it correctly again.
I wrote to it: "But you did not account for consent rate. How many people refuse cookies."
Through the ad platforms only a portion of orders gets matched. The rest goes through non-consent customers who refused cookies — they do not show up in the ad platforms, but they do in the order records. The agent knew about this gap, but did not include it in the prediction method.
After recalculation the campaign numbers rose to more realistic values.
And straight away we hit another layer.
ROUND 3 — HOW DOES ON-SITE COMMUNICATION CHANGE CONVERSION RATES?
I wrote to it: "A campaign does not have impact only through ads. When a campaign appears on the website, conversion lifts for everyone who arrives, not just clicks from ads. Including those from search referrals, direct, and so on."
Join the Library
Full access to my thoughts, personal stories, findings, and what I learn from the people I meet.
Join the Library — €29.99 per yearGet the full article by email and feel free to reply if you want to discuss it further.
Summary
Common questions on this article's topic
Can an AI agent forecast sales and orders?
How do you build an AI sales forecast?
What is the consent gap in ad attribution?
How do you measure the impact of a marketing campaign on conversion rate?
Can an AI agent replace a marketing analyst?
How do you forecast orders for a market with no history?
Related articles
AI produces the graphic, the newsletter and the product page faster than a person. What is left for the one who used to do it is the judgement — knowing whether the output is good. But most people have worse judgement than AI. And whoever cannot judge quality cannot delegate either. How do you tell whether yours is the judgement a company relies on, or the kind it can replace?
In April, in the first part of this series, I wrote about an AI prediction system I had started building on my own machine. At the time the software was a few hours old and the prediction record was empty. The record since then has shown one thing — the system does not yet understand the market it is being asked to forecast. It can pull macro context, book value, earnings. But it cannot put those together into something that helps it understand the price.
I am building an AI system to predict the S&P 500. It runs on my own machine, uses free public data — yfinance, FRED, the Shiller dataset — and grades every forecast against reality. This series documents the build itself: the decisions, the methodology, the mistakes. What I will eventually share from the running system is a separate question, and an honest one.
More articles
For a long time we treated the internet as the main road. The place where work and relationships happen. Yet most of what we see on it today is, or soon will be, AI-generated: text, images, profiles and comments. The internet is turning into an online game full of bots, where you cannot be sure that a human is on the other side of anything. So I ask: was the online world the main road, or only a temporary detour that part of us will return from, back offline?
A few days ago I interviewed a senior marketer. An experienced man, years of practice. I asked him about AI. He said he barely uses it. He had one bad experience with the output and decided he was too senior for it to add value when it is not perfect. I know the other side too — professionals who automate everything that can be automated.
Europe does not have the capacity to face a full-scale, mass drone war of the kind we see in Ukraine. Three dependencies weaken it: China supplies the physical material for defence systems, the United States supplies capabilities Europe does not have, and twenty-seven states cannot agree how fast, or who pays. Rearmament plans exist, but they are being carried out slowly.
Prague, 13 May 2026. On my way to work I started thinking about something that stayed with me for days. If most routine work on a computer disappears in the next ten years, and a large share of repetitive manual work disappears with it, what happens to the flow of money? Who pays whom for what? Which economic layers will exist, how large will they be, and what relationships will run between them? This is the six-layer map I sketched as an answer.
Will AI take my job? A certified Google trainer told me in June 2024 that my profession would cease to exist. Twenty-two months later, my job title has not changed — but ninety percent of what I do during the day is different. I have delegated more of my thinking to AI agents than I thought possible. I am not afraid. This is why, and what it means for anyone asking the same question.
One hour. Fifty-five minutes. That is how long it took to build what a Czech software firm had quoted at over €50,000. I built it with Claude Code. Not a prototype. Not a proof of concept. A working tool — the one the company actually needed. By the evening of the same day, it was running on staging. This is not about Claude Code. It is about what Claude Code exposes.
I have conducted roughly one hundred and fifty practical interviews over the past four years. Fifty for data specialist roles. A hundred for advertising and performance marketing specialists. Almost every one of them involved sitting down with a candidate over a practical task — something close to a real problem we actually need to solve at the company. Not theory. Not trivia. Applied problem-solving. Over time, I started noticing a pattern.
Four days in Catalonia. No computer, no AI, almost no social media. I bought this notebook so that I could write down what I would think about, and what I would come across and learn on the trip.
