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Europe Is Not Ready for Drone Warfare
Galați, Romania (EU and NATO territory), 29 May 2026. During the night a Russian drone struck a ten-storey block of flats. A fire broke out on the roof. A 53-year-old woman and a 14-year-old boy were taken to hospital. The drone had been heading for a Ukrainian port.
Romania's foreign minister confirmed the drone was Russian. Moscow denies responsibility and demands an examination. According to Romanian authorities, it was the twenty-eighth time a Russian drone had violated Romanian airspace since Russia began striking Ukrainian ports on the Danube.
The twenty-eighth.
The war has stopped happening 'somewhere over there'. Galați is in the European Union. It is in NATO.
On the night of 9 to 10 September 2025, around twenty Russian drones entered Polish airspace. Allied fighters, mostly Dutch F-35s, shot four of them down. It was the first time during this war that NATO destroyed a Russian asset over alliance territory. Nine days later, three Russian MiG-31s violated Estonian airspace for twelve minutes. Estonia invoked Article 4.
The war already reaches our own territory.
In 2025 Russia sent roughly 54,500 Shahed and Geran drones at Ukraine. By autumn 2025 it was sustaining an average of about 176 long-range drones a day. On the worst days it was far more: in May 2026 the record reached over 1,400 drones in 24 hours.
Those incidents and those numbers should be a warning to us.
We have to build capacity fast, fast enough to defend ourselves against this form of war.
And when you think about how to do it, you realise we are in a worse position than most Europeans admit.
We do not depend on others only to secure our defence today. We depend on others to build that defence in the first place.
Why Europe Cannot Defend Itself
Europe has a problem that money alone cannot solve. It rests on three dependencies, and each one weakens its ability to defend itself.
The first is China, the country that supplies the physical material for defence systems. The second is the United States, the country that supplies the capabilities Europe does not have. The third is ourselves, twenty-seven states that cannot agree how fast, or who pays.
Why Europe Depends on China for Its Defence
The European Union imports about 98 per cent of its rare-earth permanent magnets from China. All of its heavy rare earths. Most of its light ones. They are critical for high-performance drone motors and precision guidance. The Chinese company DJI also holds around 70 per cent of the global drone market and over 90 per cent of the consumer segment.
And here is the uncomfortable part. The same Chinese components power Russian drones too. Ukrainian intelligence estimates that 60 to 65 per cent of the parts in Russian Gerans are of Chinese origin; for critical electronics the estimates climb above 80 per cent. The figures vary by source and should be treated as an intelligence assessment, not hard fact. But the direction is clear.
So China supplies both sides. The drones that fall on European homes, and the factories where Europe would like to build its defence against them.
And China has shown it will use this. In April 2025 it imposed export controls on rare earths. The second wave, from October 2025, it 'suspended', until 10 November 2026. That is not a concession. It holds only as long as it suits China.
One thing is clear: the European Union cannot afford serious friction with China. And China knows it well. It need do nothing. It is enough that it holds the option in its hand. Europe is arming itself to defend against Russia with the permission of a country it does not dare quarrel with.
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Summary
Common questions on this article's topic
What is EDDI, the European drone wall?
Why does Europe depend on China for defence?
If you have any thoughts, questions, or feedback, feel free to drop me a message at mail@richardgolian.com.
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