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In 2025, the Slovak economy recorded the slowest growth among the V4 countries. How did Slovakia move from the position of the “Tatra Tiger” — one of the fastest-growing economies in the EU — to the bottom of the ranking? And what could change the future of the Slovak economy?
When I arrived at university in Prague in 2016, the latest available data on economic performance — such as GDP per capita in purchasing power parity — showed a clear trend. Slovakia was catching up with Czechia, and it seemed that if the pace continued, it might even overtake it.
It was not just about the data. Czech classmates, especially those studying economics, would bring it up themselves at student events. They said they envied us — mainly for the economic reforms of the early 2000s and the speed at which the Slovak economy was growing.
It felt good.
At the time, I had what now seems like a rather bold expectation: just a few more years and Slovakia would surpass its “older brother” economically and in wages. Of course, we had our problems. But there was also visible progress.
That ended very quickly.
What happened — and how can it be reversed?
The Tatra Tiger (2000–2008): How Slovakia Became One of the Fastest-Growing Economies in the EU
Slovakia went through a period when it was referred to as the “Tatra Tiger.”
Between 2004 and 2007, we were among the fastest-growing economies in the EU, with annual growth of around 6%. In the fourth quarter of 2007, year-on-year growth reached 14.3% — the highest GDP growth among all OECD and EU countries that year.
At the same time, we significantly closed the gap with Czechia. From 62% of Czech GDP per capita (PPP) in 1993, we reached around 91% in the period 2010–2013 — the closest we have ever been.
This was preceded by concrete steps. The two governments of Mikuláš Dzurinda between 1998 and 2006 launched major reforms: privatisation, opening the economy to foreign capital, and EU accession in 2004. A key step was the 2004 tax reform — a flat 19% rate for personal income, corporate income, and consumption. Slovakia became the first OECD country to implement such a system. This was combined with zero dividend tax and a more flexible labour code.
The cumulative volume of foreign direct investment increased from $2.1 billion at the beginning of 1999 to $18.45 billion by the end of 2006 — nearly a ninefold increase in seven years. By the end of 2006, FDI per capita was the highest in the region — higher than in Czechia, Hungary, and Poland.
Slovakia became attractive for capital, and the Slovak economy was widely seen as one of the most promising emerging economies in Central Europe.
Slovakia’s Economic Decline in 2026: Why Growth Has Slowed Down
Today, Slovakia is no longer as attractive to investors.
New companies are not entering Slovakia at the same scale as before, and even domestic ones are leaving. One example is GymBeam — a company with roots in Košice, which moved its holding structure to Austria after a €110 million investment.
Founder Dalibor Cicman described it clearly: Austria offers a more stable and predictable business environment.
The latest ranking of business environment predictability by the World Intellectual Property Organization placed Slovakia 115th out of 139 countries. Within the V4, Slovakia ranks last. Within the EU, it is near the bottom.
GymBeam is not an exception.
In 2025, 7,708 companies were dissolved in Slovakia — the highest number in six years. The economic decline of Slovakia is not just a statistic. It is the daily reality of companies that are leaving or shutting down.
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Summary
Common questions on this article's topic
What was Slovakia's Tatra Tiger period?
How much foreign investment did Slovakia attract during its reform period?
Why is Slovakia's economy declining?
How close did Slovakia get to catching up with Czechia economically?
What is the V4 and how does Slovakia compare to its neighbours?
Can Slovakia reverse its economic decline?
If you have any thoughts, questions, or feedback, feel free to drop me a message at mail@richardgolian.com.
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