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I often talk about my mistakes, wrong approaches, and lessons learned in my blog posts. Whether it is making purely result-oriented decisions, juggling too many tasks at once, misunderstanding AI, or delaying investments, I have made plenty of errors. I have also stumbled in more profound areas, like my worldview and understanding of our ability to know things. And let us not forget my social skills and communication blunders. As you can see, the list is long.
When it comes to dealing with mistakes publicly, I see people generally fall into two camps, with some in between but tending towards one side or the other.
One extreme is the person who tries to appear flawless. When they make a mistake, they look for blame everywhere but themselves and only admit fault when they have no other choice. I know several people like this, both professionally and personally. Honestly, during my teenage years, I was closer to this type. I wrote about this a few years ago.
On the other end is the person who, when faced with a mistake, first asks what they could have done better. They look inward. For example, if a new team member does not meet expectations, the department head might reflect on whether they could have provided better guidance, improved onboarding, or made a better hiring choice. The point of this post could be that now i tend to think more like this.
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Summary
Common questions on this article's topic
Why treat every non-optimal decision as a mistake?
What is the difference between judging decisions by outcomes versus by process?
Who is Martin Kabrhel and why is his thinking relevant?
How does treating mistakes this way accelerate personal growth?
Is this approach consistent with Carol Dweck's growth mindset research?
Is this mindset realistic or does it lead to excessive self-criticism?
If you have any thoughts, questions, or feedback, feel free to drop me a message at mail@richardgolian.com.
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